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CRIMINAL INSANITY PROCEDURES IN KENTUCKY
I. IN MODUCflON
The mental condition of the accused is one of the significant factors
in the criminal process. Every American jurisdiction has statutory
procedures for determining this condition.' In many instances, how-
ever, these procedures are vague and incomplete.2 Therefore, several
states have revised, or are currently revising, their criminal laws on this
subject.3 In general, the revisions have been directed toward de-
termining: (1) a defendant's mental capacity to stand trial; (2) his
criminal responsibility at the time of the offense; and (3) the disposi-
tion of the mentally ill offender after trial.4
The purpose of this note is to examine Kentucky's criminal law
in the above areas, and to compare its procedures with methods em-
ployed by other jurisdictions. Finally, the psychiatric treatment pro-
vided for the criminal in Kentucky's mental hospitals and penitentiaries
will be discussed.
II. PRi-TmxL MEvrAL EXA.MIATToN-INcoMPErENCY
According to common law, a defendant is not tried for a crime if he
is unable to understand the charges brought against him or if he can-
not assist counsel in preparing his defense. 5 Courts consider it funda-
mentally unfair to convict a man who does not meet minimum stand-
ards of mental competency.6 Moreover, some authorities consider such
a conviction, a violation of constitutional due process.7 Therefore,
when a defendant is found to be mentally incompetent, trial pro-
ceedings are postponed until his health is restored.
The common law criteria for competency to stand trial have been
approved by the American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code8
I See, e.g., Tim MENTALLY DisABLDr AND THE LAW 330, 373-95 (Lindman
& McIntyre eds. 1961).2 Id.
3 Illinois, Minnesota, New York and Wisconsin are examples of states which
have revised their laws on criminal insanity. Current proposals for such revisions
have been made in the states of Delaware, Michigan and Texas.
4 See, e.g., Sadoff, Mental Illness and the Criminal Process: The Role of the
Psychiatrist, 54 A.B.A.J. 566 (1968).
5 NEw Yonx CrTY BAR AssocrAioN & FoRDHAm LAW SCHOOL, MENTAL.
ILLNEs s, DuE PnocEss AND TmE CRnmwNAL DEFENDANT 80 (1968); Morse, The
Aberrational Man: A Collection of Medical and Legal Treatments of the Abnormal
Mind: A Tour de Force of Legal Psychiatry, 42 TuL. L. REV. 67 (1967); Polsky,
Present Insanity-From the Common Law to the Mental Health Act and Back,
2 VL L. L. REv. 504 (1957).6 MENTrL ILLNEss, DuE PuocEss AND THE CnmNAL DEFENDANT, supra note
5; Tim MENTALLY DisA3LED AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 357.
7 THE MENTALLY DisABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 1, at 357.
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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and are embodied in the statutes of many states.9 Kentucky has no
statute which states the standard for determining mental competency
to stand trial. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, adopted the
common law standard in Strickland v. Commonwealth:0
The terms 'insane', 'unsound mind', and 'mental illness' are too loose to
serve as a reasonable test of whether a person is properly fit to plead or
defend himself in a criminal proceeding. For this purpose, whatever may
be the technical classification of his mental state, legally or medically,
the test is whether he has substantial capacity to comprehend the nature
and consequences of the proceeding pending against him and to parti-
cipate rationally in his defense."1
Almost anyone can raise the issue of a defendant's capacity to
stand trial, but in most cases the defendant is not examined unless
the court considers it necessary. However, in Massachusetts a court is
required to order a mental examination of all defendants who are ac-
cused of certain crimes.' 2 Kentucky has a similar statute,13 but it has
been interpreted to be permissive rather than mandatory.' 4
Kentucky provides for the determination of a defendant's com-
petency to stand trial in Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.06.
This Rule states that if the court has reasonable grounds to believe
that the defendant is insane, the trial proceedings shall be postponed
until his mental capacity is determined. This Rule has been construed
to give the trial judge complete discretion on whether to order a mental
examination.' 5 Furthermore, a ruling by the trial judge on a defendant's
motion for a mental examination is an interlocutory decree which will
be reviewed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion.' 6
The criminal law in Kentucky does not specify what procedures
the trial judge must follow to ascertain whether the defendant is
9 Annot., 8 A.L.R. 94 (1919).10 875 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964).
"1 Id. at 703.
12 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 128, § 100A (1964 Supp.). All defendants who are
indicted for capital offenses or as habitual defendants are given a mental examina-
tion.
13 KRS § 210.860 (Cumin. Supp. 1968), formerly KRS § 203.340 (1962).
14 Copeland v. Commonwealth, 897 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1965).
'5 Kilgore v. Commonwealth, 810 Ky. 826, 222 S.W.2d 600 (1949); Murrell
v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 65, 168 S.W.2d 1 (1942).
'
6 Murrell v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 65, 168 S.W.2d 1 (1942). For a
shocking case in whicl defendant was denied a sanity inquest before trial, see
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.2d 678 (Ky. 1951). The defendant was
accused of strangling a three year old girl to death and afterwards of "committing
perverted sexual acts upon her body." The Court declared, "[c]learly there is no
showing" that the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to conduct a
sanity hearing. See also McElwain v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1966);
Vincent v. Commonwealth. 894 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1965); Court of Appeals Review,
55 Ky. L.T. 885-86 (1967); But see Barnes v. Commonwealth, 897 S.W.2d 44
(Ky. 1965).
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mentally competent to stand trial. Rule 8.06 states only that the issue
of sanity shall be "determined as provided by law." This phrase
probably refers to civil competency procedures, since the defendant
obviously is not a criminal until proven guilty. This probability is
buttressed by a Kentucky Attorney General Opinion which suggests
that civil procedures be used,17 and by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
which holds that a jury is not necessary to determine competency. 18
Nevertheless, if Rule 8.06 is intended to refer to civil competency
procedures, it should be made more specific. At present, a criminal
defendant cannot be sure what competency procedures will be used
by the trial judge.
In 1968, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted many new mental
health laws which streamline civil commitment procedures and provide
legal safeguards for mental patients.19 For example, statutes now pro-
vide for the protection of a patient's right to communicate with his
attorney20 and to enter into contractual relationships.2 ' In addition,
new statutes specify definite time periods in which the patient's
mental condition must be reviewed.22 This later provision is designed
to prevent the possibility of a patient becoming "lost" in a mental
institution.23 Because of these new laws, it is now even more important
that Kentucky's Criminal Rules make civil procedures applicable to the
criminal defendant.
The Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure need revision in other
important areas. For example, the Rules should expressly provide
that a court may dismiss charges against an incompetent defendant
who has been committed for treatment. The Model Penal Code con-
tains such a provision which states that an incompetent defendant
should be discharged or placed in an appropriate institution subject
to civil mental health procedures when it would be unjust to resume
the criminal prosecution. 24 Although the Kentucky courts have some-
times followed this procedure, there is no authority for such action in
17 1964 Ky. ATT'Y GEN. Op. 521.
18 Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1964). There is some
question, however, whether the Court would recommend civil procedures since it
has adopted a different standard of competency for the criminal defendant from
that which is used in the civil procedures.
19 KRS ch. 202 (Cumm. Supp. 1968) (Hospitalization of Mental Patients);
KRS ch. 203 (Cumin. Supp. 1968) (Incompetency Proceedings).
20 KRS § 202.136 (Cumin. Supp. 1968); KRS § 202.272(4) (Cumin. Supp.
1968).
21 KRS § 202.272(3) (Cumin. Supp. 1968).
22 KRS § 202.027 (Cumin. Supp. 1968); KRS § 202.100 (Cumi. Supp.
1968); KRS § 202.239 (Cumm. Supp. 1968).
23 Cf. Willis, Psychiatric Testimony, Trial Gamesmanship and the Defense of
Insanity, 5 SAN. Dmco LAw REv. 32, 88 (1968).24 MODEL PF.NAL CODE § 4.06 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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the Criminal Rules. 25 After a defendant has spent months or years
in a mental institution, it is difficult to find evidence or to obtain
witnesses for his case. To prevent injustice, the court should have
authority to dismiss the criminal charges.
Of course, if the court believes a fair trial is possible, the crim-
inal proceedings against a mentally restored defendant should be re-
sumed. Any prison sentence given in such a case, however, should be
reduced by the amount of time the defendant has already spent in a
mental institution. A defendant should not be required to endure many
months in a mental institution only to be released with his full prison
sentence remaining. Such a procedure would not only hinder any
chance of rehabilitating the criminal, but it might encourage at-
torneys to advise incompetent defendants to stand trial.26 Illinois has
recognized this problem and has included such a time credit in its
Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 7 but Kentucky's Criminal Rules do not
contain this needed provision.
Because many states do not provide proper mental health facilities
or have adequate criminal procedures, strong objections have been
made to pre-trial competency proceedings. 28 One author has asserted
that forty-five percent of persons committed because of incompetency
meet the test of competency and that the procedural rule for de-
termining incompetency is merely employed to accomplish preventive
detention.29 Another writer has stated, "that because of the enormous
potential threat to civil liberties, psychiatrists would do better to
define incompetency only in the most severe case of deficiency, con-
fusion or disorganization."3 0
In Kentucky, the General Assembly has provided fair and equitable
competency procedures. 31 When a defendant's mental condition is in
question a circuit court appoints at least two physicians to submit a
25 Dr. John Corcella, M.D., Chief of Staff at Eastern State Hospital, Lexington,
Ky., stated in an interview on November 4, 1968, that the criminal defendant is
rarely declared incompetent. Dr. Corcella added, however, that if a defendant is
admitted to the hospital for incompetency, the courts normally drop the criminal
charges against him.2 6 Cf. Hall, The Scientific and Humane Studu of Criminal Law. 42 B. U.L.
1F1v. 267, 278 (1962); Note, Pre-Trial Mental Examination and Commitment:
Some Procedural Problems in the District of Columbia, 51 GEo. L.J. 143, 155-56
(1962).2 7 ILL. CODE CMIv. Pnoc. § 104-3(c) (1963).
28 Cf. Halleck, A Critique of Current Psychiatric Roles in the Legal Process,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 379; Vann & Morgenroth. Psychiatrists and the Competence to
Stand Trial, 42 U. DEr. L.J. 75, 78 n.15 (1964).29 Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 13 KAN. L&w REv.
59, 71 (1964).
30 S. HALLECK, PsYcHIATRY AND TmE DmummAs oF Cnmvm 225 (1967).31 KBS ch. 202 (Cumin. Sunp. 1968) (Hospitalization of Mental Patients);
KRS ch. 203 (Cumin. Supp. 1968) (Incompetency Proceedings).
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certified opinion of his mental health. 32 If the physicians believe the
defendant should be committed to an institution for treatment, the
court must conduct a hearing. Although the hearing is somewhat in-
formal, witnesses are examined and evidence is introduced. The de-
fendant is entitled to an attorney at the hearing.33 If the court finds
that the defendant is mentally ill and will probably cause injury to him-
self or others, or that he lacks capacity to make responsible decisions,
he is committed to an institution for an indeterminate period.3 4 How-
ever, the institution must submit a report of the defendant's condition
to the court at least every six months.3 5
If all the states would end the inequities in pre-trial competency
determination, the whole criminal process dealing with mentally ill of-
fenders might be improved. The early detection of an incompetent de-
fendent would reduce expensive judicial proceedings and would
provide psychiatric help at a time when recovery may be possible.
Furthermore, the problems encountered by the courts in dealing with
the insanity defense at trial might be avoided. The psychiatrist would
escape the difficult job of testifying under the rigid criminal re-
sponsibility standards, and of determining the defendant's prior mental
condition.3"
J.I. INsANIT DEFENSE AT TRLIL
At trial, a defendant may raise the issue of his mental condition
by pleading insanity. Although every offender is presumed to be re-
sponsible for his criminal acts,37 he has traditionally been excused for
such acts when he lacks "free will" over his conduct,38 or commits a
crime for no rational reason.39 Unlike pre-trial incompetency, criminal
insanity is determined at the time of the offense, and if proven, will
absolve a defendant of a crime.40
32KRS § 202.020 (Cumin. Supp. 1968); KRS § 202.135 (Cumin. Supp.
1968).
S3KRS § 202.135 (Cumin. Supp. 1968).
341d.
35KRS § 202.239 (Cumin. Supp. 1968).
3S Polsky, supra note 5, at 505-06; Sadoff, supra note 4, at 567.
3 7 E.g., Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REv. 583, 585 (1968).3 8 E.g., Comment, Mental Illness and Criminal Responsibility, 5 TULSA LJ.
171, 178 (1968).
39 THE MENTALLY DISABLED AN TE LAW, supra note 1, at 330.40 See generally 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 26 (1965). In California, the
defense of diminished responsiility is available to a defendant in addition to the
defense of insanity. Under the diminished responsibility doctrine, a defendant
cannot be convicted of certain crimes, such as murder, burglary, and assault, un-
less it is shown that he possessed the requisite elements of criminal intent. This
doctrine was established in People v. Gorshen, 336 P.2d 492 (Cal. 1959), where
the court stated: (Continued on next page)
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Criminal insanity is defined in legal rather than medical term-
inology. Although the legal authorities have struggled for years to
define the boundaries of criminal responsibility, at present there is no
uniform standard applied by all states.41 The "knowledge of right and
wrong" test applied in the famous M'Naghten Case4 was one of the
first standards formulated by the courts.43 This rule, or an adaptation
of it,44 is still employed by the majority of states, although it has
been the subject of endless controversy.45
Many medical authorities have often complained that the
M'Naghten rule is such a restrictive approach that it forces the medical
witness to make the moral decision of what is right or wrong.40 Partly
because of this criticism, such standards as the Durham rule,47 the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
• . . on the trial of the issues raised by a plea of not guilty to a charge
of a crime which requires proof of a specific mental state, competent
evidence that because of mental abnormality not amounting to legal
insanity defendant did not possess the essential specific mental state is
admissible. Id. at 498.
In People v. Fortham, 64 Cal. Reptr. 669, 257 A.C.A. 58 (1967), the court stated:
It is now well established in this state that substantial evidence of mental
illness short of legal insanity is a significant factor in negating the specific
legal intent essential to an offense. Under this rule, if murder is charged
and it is shown that the defendant, though legally sane, was suffering
from a diminished mental capacity caused by into.,cation, trauma or
disease which prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with
premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder in the
first degree. Id. at 672, 257 A.C.A. at 60.
Diminished responsibility is presently being asserted in the trial of Sirhan Sirhan,
the accused murderer of Robert F. Kennedy.
41 Broeder & Merson, Robinson v. California: An Abbreviated Study, 3
Am. Caim. L.Q. 203, 205 (1965).
428 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
43The M'Naghten rule is usually given as follows:
To establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if
he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
44 In some states the M'Naghten rule is combined with an irresistible impulse
test. This test applies to a defendant who may know right from wrong but who
cannot resist the criminal act. See Tim MENTALLY DisABLED AND T=E LAW,
supra note 1, at 332-33.
45 See Cohen, Criminal Responsibility and the Knowledge of Right and Wrong,
14 U. MIAMI L. 11Ev. 30 (1959); Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and
Beyond, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 188 (1959); Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplace-
able: Recent Events in the Law of Incapacity, 50 Go. L.J. 105 (1961).
46 Cf. Usdin, Criminal Responsibility and the Psychiatrist, 3 Am. CGlau. L.Q.
116, 118-19 (1965).
47 Under the Durham rule, . . . an accused is not criminally responsible if
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Model Penal Code rule,48 and the Currens rule49 have been formulated.
Of the new standards, the Model Penal Code rule has been the most
widely accepted. The states of Vermont, Illinois, New York, Wisconsin
and Maryland have adopted this rule,50 and some authorities believe
that it will eventually be approved by a majority of states.51 It will be
unfortunate if all states do not agree on a uniform criminal re-
sponsibility standard. As one writer has noted, at present, one state
may determine a defendant to be criminally insane, while at the same
time another state might hold him responsible. 52
For various reasons, objections have been raised concerning the
use of any criminal insanity test.5 3 Some writers contend that a de-
fendant cannot be neatly classified as sane or insane, and any criminal
responsibility standard must necessarily require such classification.54
Other authorities believe that a standard is unnecessary because the
issue of insanity is inevitably determined by a jury.55 These writers
argue that juries ignore insanity instructions and base their decisions
on their own understanding of criminal responsibility. One author
states, "[j] uries want to know whether the defendant is really a
"bad" person and they could not be less interested in the complexities
of his psycho-motivation" 58 Regardless of these objections, however,
the courts have continued to make use of insanity standards.
In Kentucky there is no codified standard for criminal responsi-
48 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantia capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness]
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not
include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct.
40 United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961). The Currens rule
provides:
A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time he
acts, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law. Id. at 774.
GO Robitscher, Psychiatry and Changing Concepts of Criminal Responsibility,
31 FED. PROB. 45, 46 -(1967).
51 MicH. REv. Cram . CODE § 705, Comment (Final Draft 1967).52 Broeder & Merson, supra note 41.
s E.g., Newsome v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 174, 179-80 (Ky. 1962)
(dissenting opinion); Magnus, Psychiatric Evidence in the Common Law Courts,
17 B.iYLoRL. Rxv. 1, 9 (1965).
54 See, e.g., Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of The Mentally Ill, 14 STAN.
L. REV. 59, 62 (1962).
55 See, e.g., Newsome v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 174, 179-80 (Ky. 1962)
(dissenting opinion); Slovenko, supra note 29, at 68.56 Note, Madness in the Criminal Law, 40 TEmP. L.Q. 348, 357 (1967).
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bility. Until recently, the Kentucky courts used the M'Naghten rule
in jury instructions on insanity.57 In Terry v. Commonwealth,58 how-
ever, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the standard used in
the Model Penal Code "properly reflects the law."59 The Court stated
that a jury should be instructed on insanity as follows:
The law presumes every man sane until the contrary is shown by the
evidence. Before the defendant can be excused on the ground of insanity
the jury must believe from the evidence that at the time of the killing
[criminal conduct], the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
(a) was substantially unable to understand that he was violating the law
or, (b) if he did understand it, was nevertheless substantially unable
to resist his impulse to commit the illegal act.60
Although the Court in Terry supposedly adopted the standard of
the Model Penal Code, it failed to use its exact language. The Model
Penal Code provides:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law.61
Despite the discrepancy between the two standards, the Court has
upheld the use of either standard by lower courts. For instance in
Graham v. Commonwealth,62 the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld
a circuit court's application of the Code in an insanity instruction.6
Although the Court regarded the use of the Terry instruction as a
"safer and better practice," it held that the use of the Code was not
improper.6 The Court added, "In our view the two instructions ex-
press the same thought in different language, either of which
adequately presents so much of the insanity defense as it purports to
cover."65
Since the Kentucky Court has made no legal distinction between
the two instructions, why a deviation was made in the language of the
Code is not clear. The use of different insanity standards within the
State will impede the chances for uniformity in insanity instructions in
Kentucky as well as in the United States, and may lead to inconsistent
decisions. Although a jury may not always recognize the distinction, a
57 Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. 1963).
58371 S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1963).
59 Id. at 865.
60 Id.
61 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
62420 S.W.2d 575 (Ky. 1967).
63 Id. at 577-78.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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psychiatrist could conceivably express a different opinion depending
on the standard employed. As Justice Palmore stated with regard to
the distinction between the M'Naghten and Terry rules, "certainly the
medical witness, on whose testimony life and death may hang in the
balance, will recognize that the improvement in terminology is far
more than 'technical'."66 The legislature should clarify the law in this
area by codifying the standard of criminal responsibility to be used
by the courts.
Most states allow not only the court, but also the state or defense
counsel, to call psychiatrists to testify concerning the defendant's
mental condition.67 Because the average jury cannot detect mental
illness, it must rely heavily on the testimony of these medical witnesses
in reaching a verdict. In most cases, however, the jury is confronted
with the problem of choosing between conflicting opinions from
equally qualified witnesses.
The conflicting testimony of the medical experts most often occurs
when hypothetical questions are used.68 These questions are usually
allowed whenever the witness has not personally examined the de-
fendant. In such cases the witness is asked to give his opinion on an as-
sumed set of facts. The examining party is generally permitted to
select, at his discretion, any set of facts available from evidence
presented at the trial.69 Some authorities assert that this method of
selection enables the parties to ask the type of question which will
elicit the "desired" answer from the witness. 70 Thus, while the medical
witnesses may be correctly answering the questions posed, they are
reaching different conclusions concerning the defendant's mental con-
dition. To prevent this result, critics suggest that the courts either
forbid the use of hypothetical questions or regulate the facts to be as-
sumed.71 Perhaps the Model Penal Code has reached a better solution
by prohibiting a medical expert from testifying if he has not examined
the defendant.72 With such a prohibition, the need for hypothetical
questioning in most cases is eliminated.
Another reason often cited for the cause of conflicting testimony is
the application of exclusionary rules of evidence to the opinions given
66Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Ky. 1963) (concurring
opinion).6 7 Kentucky follows this procedure for employing expert witnesses.
68 Cf. Willis, supra note 23, at 53.
69C. McConzncx, EvDmCEsc § 14 (1954).
T0 d, Willis, supra note 23, at 32.
71C. McCoMIcr, EvmErcE § 14 (1954); see Diamond & Louisell, The
Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 Micx.
L. REv. 1335, 1346 (1965).72 MODEL PFNAL CODE § 4.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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by the medical witness. 73 Courts sometimes allow the use of such
evidentiary rules as privileged communications, opinion, and hearsay
to exclude much of the psychiatrist's testimony.74 In some instances,
therefore, medical opinions on the defendant's condition seem con-
flicting because the facts on which they were based are not given.
The use of these exclusionary rules of evidence may also cause the
jury to unjustifiably reject, or accept, a psychiatrist's conclusions.
The psychiatrist must consider all information he has received con-
cerning the defendant in making a determination of his condition,
regardless of whether it is admissible as evidence. If the witness can-
not testify on this information the jury cannot properly weigh his
opinion. Due to the ambiguous language used in psychiatry, the
mere classification of a defendant into a certain mental category is
practically meaningless. Therefore, the jury is left with nothing but
the credibility of the psychiatrist as a basis in making its decision.75
To prevent the application of the exclusionary rules of evidence to
the testimony of the medical witness, the criminal law should provide
that a psychiatrist be permitted to make any explanation reasonably
necessary to clarify his diagnosis and opinion, and may be cross-
examined concerning any matter bearing on his competency or credi-
bility or the validity of his diagnosis or opinion. 6 By allowing such
open testimony, the jury would then have some means other than the
witness' personality or professional credentials to evaluate the medical
opinion.77 Moreover, the psychiatrist would assume his proper role as
a physician rather than as a judge.78
IV. DIsPosmoN OF THE CiM~nALY INSANE
Generally, when a defendant is acquitted on the grounds of insanity,
he is examined to determine his present mental condition. The purpose
of this examination is to assure the court that the defendant is no
longer dangerous to society.79 Therefore, although a defendant may
have only been suffering from temporary insanity at the time of his
73 Allen, Admission of Psychiatric Evidence: First, A General Standard, 8
Ariz. L. Rxv. 205 (1967); Magnus, Psychiatric Evidence in the Common Law
Courts, 17 BAYLOR L. BEv. 1, 3 (1965).7 4 Allen, supra note 73, at 206.75 E.g., S. HALLEcK, supra note 30, at 216; Comment, The Insanity Defense
Under the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. BEv. 863, 868 (1968).7 6 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
77 S. HALLECrK, supra note 30, at 225.
78 Cf. Usdin, supra note 45, at 119.
79 Pre-Trial ._ental Examination and Commitment: Some Procedural Problems
in the District of Columbia, supra note 26, at 169; 21 Am. Jim. 2d Criminal Law
§ 55 (1965).
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criminal conduct, a presumption remains that insanity has continued
past the conclusion of the trial.80
The Model Penal Codes' and a minority of statess- require the
commitment of a defendant to an appropriate institution for custody
and observation after trial if he is acquitted on the grounds of in-
sanity. Assertions have been made that this mandatory commitment
procedure makes the defense of insanity more acceptable to the public
and the jury.83 In addition, some authorities have contended that,
although the defendant's mental condition may have improved, his
personality and background may still make him dangerous.8 4
In Kentucky, the Criminal Rules do not specifically require the
commitment of a defendant who has been acquitted for insanity. Rule
9.90 states that the court may on motion of the prosecuting attorney, or
on its own motion, impanel a jury to determine the defendant's present
mental condition, or it may have the issue determined as otherwise
provided by law. The latter provision of this Rule apparently means
that civil insanity procedures are employed when the court does not
impanel a jury. If the defendant is found to be presently insane, he is
committed to a mental hospital for treatment. However, the defendant
is released when he is found in good mental condition. 5
For various reasons, Kentucky's method of handling the acquitted
defendant seems preferable to the mandatory commitment procedure.
Obviously not every defendant is presently insane merely because he
was insane at the time of the criminal act. Yet, when a state employs
an automatic commitment procedure, each defendant, including those
in good health, is committed to a mental institution. Because these
institutions are often severely understaffed and have inadequate
facilities, such defendants may be confined for a considerable time
before they are examined. 86 In many jurisdictions the mental health
laws are so incomplete that the defendant is left without a remedy.87
The automatic commitment procedure may provide a means for a
state to control those defendants who may have feigned mental illness
to gain an acquittal. 8 By following such a scheme, however, the
defendant is punished despite his acquittal, and consequently the
80 21 Am. Ju. 2d Criminal Law § 55 (1965).
8 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
82 MODEL PErAL CODE § 4.08, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
83 Id.
84 Id.85 Interview with Dr. John Corcella, M.D., Chief of Staff at Eastern State
Hospital, in Lexington, Kentucky, November 4, 1968.8 Pre-Trial Mental Examination and Commitment: Some Procedural Prob-
lems in the District of Columbia, supra note 26, at 164-69.87Slovenko, supra note 29, at 76.
8 8 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 82.
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mental institutions are changed from hospitals to prisons. Moreover,
if medical authorities are allowed to determine who has feigned
mental illness, then they are, in effect, replacing the court and jury in
determining the disposition of the defendant. If this is the desired re-
sult, the criminal law on disposition should be changed, rather than
using commitment procedures for this purpose. The states, by using
the commitment procedures to detain a criminal, have shown a basic
mistrust for the jury system in deciding the disposition of a defendant.
V. PsYcmATRIc T A TMENTr FOR THE CoNvIcrED
A convicted offender who is serving a penitentiary term receives
very little psychiatric treatment. Estimates show that in the United
States there is only one psychiatrist for every two to three thousand
federal prisoners and only one for every ten to twelve thousand offend-
ers in state prisons.89 In Kentucky, there is not one psychiatrist in the
entire penal system. Nevertheless, at just one of Kentucky's peni-
tentiaries, there are approximately ninty psychotic prisoners and ap-
proximately two hundred more who are so retarded as to be a prob-
lemY° Those offenders who are thought to be mentally ill are trans-
ferred to state mental hospitals for short periods. The mental hospitals
are so overcrowded, however, that these mentally disturbed prisoners
can be given only minimum treatment.91 In addition, the prisoners
create security problems for the mental institutions since there is only
one state mental hospital equipped with a maximum security ward
and it is needed entirely by the Mental Health Department. 2
Many times a prisoner's emotional problems are created by the pri-
son itself. A recent study of prison conditions in Kentucky,93 states:
There are hundreds of youthful, impressionable inmates confined in
these institutions with hardened criminals, aggressive psychopaths, de-
generates, and almost every type of perverted person, in some instances
without even the most elementary provision for their personal welfare,
physical needs and protection-much less rehabilitation. There are
hundreds of others-adult offenders-confined for the first time, who,
while they have made serious mistakes, are not basically criminal.
These are in the same institution.9 4
89 Slovenko, supra note 26, at 76.
90 KENTUCKY LEGISLATir IVESEARCH CommissioN, SuBcoNMD&rEE ON MENTAL
HEALTH: 1967 REPORT (Info. Bul. No. 62, 1967).
91 The Courier-Journal, April 2, 1959, § B, at 1, col. 1.92 KENTUCKY LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH CoMIsioN, supra note 90, at 11.
9 3 NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRuME & DELINQUENCY, A STUDY AND l cor-
MNIATIONS FOR THE KENTUCKY ColMATrn FoR CoRREC-ION REsrARcn (1963).
94 Id. at 3.3.
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Both of the prisons for male offenders in Kentucky are populated
at 125 per cent of optimum capacity.95 In 1963, a prison newspaper in
Kentucky reported that in the prison there had been four suicides by
hanging within one year.9 9 The paper reported that at least two of the
four prisoners had backgrounds of mental illness.97
The most frequent answer given to the problems of the prisons is
to provide more money. Of course much more money will be needed
to provide better personnel and physical facilities, but the prisons
must also develop worthwhile rehabilitation programs. Correctional
institutions should study the various types of rehabilitation centers
now in existence to aid them in planning these programs.98 In ad-
dition, the criminal law should allow the release of a prisoner before
his time for parole has expired when the prison authorities believe it
will be helpful. As one writer has stated, "Psychiatrists have learned
that one of the vital secrets of rehabilitation is that when a patient
responds to the corrective program he must be returned to a suitable
place in society when ready."99
VI. CoNCLUsIos
In Kentucky, courts have frequently formulated the law on criminal
insanity. In areas where the legislature has failed to act, or where the
statutes have been vague and incomplete, courts have been required to
construct the law. Partly because of this, there are many gaps in Ken-
tucky criminal insanity procedures. Some of the more obvious de-
ficiencies are:
(1) There is no codified standard for either pre-trial competency or
criminal responsibility.
(2) The Kentucky Court of Appeals has recognized the use of two
criminal responsibility standards in Kentucky. Such a practice could
conceivably, and probably does, lead to inconsistent decisions.
(3) There has been no attempt by the legislature to formulate laws which
might eliminate the troublesome problem of conflicting testimony
among medical witnesses. Some states have effectively restricted
the use of hyothetical questioning and the application of exclusi-
onary rules of evidence in this area.
(4) The criminal procedures are ambiguous on whether the recently
revised civil mental health laws are applicable to the criminal de-
95 Palmore, After the Verdict, 26 Ky. S.B.J. 32, 38 (1962).
96 Castle on the Cumberland, July 15, 1963, at 4, col. 2.
97 Id.98 See Palmore, supra note 95, at 40; Menninger, Verdict Guilty-Notw What?,
HARPER's MAc., June 6, 1959, at 60.
99 Palmore, supra note 90, at 36.
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fendant. Due to the intolerable conditions in some of Kentucky's
mental institutions, it is extremely important that these civil laws
apply to the criminal defendant.
(5) There is no authority for the courts to dismiss criminal charges
against an incompetent or mentally ill defendant who has been com-
mitted to a mental institution.
(6) There is no statutory provisicn for allowing the courts to deduct
from a prison sentence the time spent by a defendant in a mental
institution.
Of course, this list is by no means complete. It is presented merely
to illustrate the inadequacies and inequities in the Kentucky insanity
laws. If the criminal defendant is to obtain due process, the legislature
cannot delay in revising its law and procedure.
James Whitlow
